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INTRODUCTION
Global climate change is a multi-faceted international crisis that
requires creative and flexible regulatory solutions. Addressing the
principal anthropogenic cause of climate change—carbon dioxide
emissions from the burning of fossil fuels—has been the focus of the
1
international response to global climate change to date. However, a
significant and often overlooked source of global carbon dioxide
emissions is deforestation, which accounts for up to eighteen percent
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1. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, 216 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (establishing emissions
reduction targets and timetables pursuant to which parties must reduce carbon dioxide
emissions to 1990 levels by an average of 5% below their 1990 levels over a five-year
commitment period from 2008–2012). For a discussion of the need to address alternatives to
traditional command-and-control emissions reductions and apply more flexible regulatory
approaches in the fight against climate change, see generally Jillian Button, Carbon:
Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on the Currency
Market, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 571 (2008); Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible
Mechanisms for Climate Change Compliance: Emission Offset Purchases Under the Clean
Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 44 (2008); Robert DeLay, Our Post-Kyoto
Treaty Climate Change Framework: Open Market Carbon-Ranching as Smart Development, 17
PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 55 (2008); Albert Mumma & David Hodas, Designing a Global PostKyoto Climate Change Protocol That Advances Human Development, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 619 (2008); Romulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: The
Evolving Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism
Ten Years After the Kyoto Protocol, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634 (2008); Sophie Smyth, Can
Business Learn to Love the Environment? The Case for a U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund, 58
RUTGERS L. REV. 451 (2006).
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of global carbon dioxide emissions annually. Tropical forests store
120-400 tons of carbon per square hectare of vegetation, which is
released into the atmosphere when the forests are burned or
3
harvested.
The critically important role that forests play in international
carbon release and storage has been a recent focus of negotiations of
the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Kyoto Protocol in Bali,
4
5
6
Indonesia and Poznan, Poland. The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012,
and negotiations for the terms of its successor are underway as of this
7
writing. A focus of these negotiations is that it is essential to
establish regulatory mechanisms to help curb emissions from tropical
deforestation in any effective post-Kyoto plan to combat global
8
climate change.
Despite increasing awareness of the link between deforestation
and climate change, tropical deforestation rates are accelerating
dramatically. International deforestation in the past 240 years has
caused a net release of approximately 121 gigatons of carbon, sixty
percent of which is attributable to tropical deforestation in the past

2. SIR NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 171 (2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.
Deforestation is the second largest cause of greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Daniel
Howden, Destruction of Rainforest Accelerates Despite Outcry, INDEP., Jan. 18, 2008, available
at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/green-living/destruction-of-rainforest-accelerates
-despite-outcry-770904.html.
3. William F. Laurence, A New Initiative to Use Carbon Trading for Tropical Forest
Conservation, 39 BIOTROPICA 20, 21 (2007).
4. See Dan Shapely, Corals and Forests: Climate Fix or Consensus Foe? Friday’s Roundup
of News from the U.N. Global Warming Summit in Bali, THE DAILY GREEN, Dec. 7, 2007,
http:// www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latest/coral-forest-climate-47120706; Mark
Kinver, Forests ‘facing a testing time’, BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
science/nature/7942237.stm.
5. See National Association of Forest Industries, Australian Forest Industries Delegation
at Poznan Climate Change Negotiations, 1–12 December 2008, available at http://
www.nafi.com.au/userfiles/briefing/Update%20on%20UNFCCC%20forest%20delegation.pdf;
Anup Shah, COP14 – Poznan Climate Conference, GLOBAL ISSUES, Jan. 1, 2009, http://
www.globalissues.org/article/771/cop14-poznan-climate-conference.
6. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3.
7. The 15th COP meeting, which addressed goals and strategies for Kyoto’s successor, was
held in Copenhagen, Denmark on December 7–18 2009. See generally COP15 United Nations
Climate Change Conference Copenhagen 2009, http://en.cop15.dk/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).
8. An incentive mechanism to reduce deforestation in developing countries also is
important because it would likely goad U.S. participation in future international climate change
negotiations. See Laurence, supra note 3, at 23. One of the principal concerns that kept the
U.S. out of Kyoto was the Protocol’s failure to address increasing carbon emissions from
developing countries. Id.
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9

half century. During the 1980s, tropical deforestation accounted for
more than ninety percent of carbon dioxide emissions from
10
deforestation. In 2007, the deforestation rate of the Amazon in
Brazil nearly quadrupled for the months of August through
December, with monthly numbers increasing from 234 square
11
kilometers in August to 948 square kilometers in December. In
2008, Brazil’s National Institute of Space Research reported that
newly deforested areas in the Amazon comprised 1124 square
kilometers in April, 1096 square kilometers in May, and 870 square
12
kilometers in June. Tropical deforestation in Indonesia is even more
staggering, with rates in excess of one million hectares per year as of
13
this writing.
Tropical deforestation is a multi-faceted threat to the
international climate change crisis. In addition to releasing stored
carbon, it reduces the remaining forests’ capacity to absorb carbon
14
from the atmosphere. Furthermore, the loss of tropical forests will
have significant effects on our planet’s natural climate stabilizers. For
example, the Amazon rainforest alone emits approximately seven
trillion tons of water per year into the atmosphere, which ultimately
15
turns into water vapor. This water vapor has a significant cooling
16
effect on global climate patterns.

9. DAVID HUNTER, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 637
(Foundation Press 2007).
10. Id. at 637–38.
11. Michael Kepp, Recent Jump in Amazon Deforestation Rates Prompts Brazil to Adopt
Emergency Measures, 31 INT’L ENV’T REP. 113, 113 (2008).
12. Port of Entry, Brazil: Deforestation in the Amazon Dropped 62.8% in July (Sept. 2,
2008), http://www.portofentry.com/site/root/resources/industry_news/6954.html. In 2007, the
World Wildlife Fund published a report that predicts that the Amazon could be essentially
decimated by 2030. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, Amazon – World’s Largest Tropical Rain Forest
and River Basin, http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/wherewework/amazon/index.html (last
visited Dec. 28, 2009).
13. FOREST INVENTORY AND MAPPING CENTRE: MINISTRY OF FORESTRY, MONITORING
OF DEFORESTATION RATE IN INDONESIA: ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION, available at
http://www.dephut.go.id/informasi/unff/COP%2013/Model%20no%203%20utk%20email.pdf.
With approximately 120 million hectares, Indonesia ranks third in the world in rainforest area
after Brazil and the Congo. Carbon Absorbing Tropical Forests a Potential Goldmine, CARBON
OFFSETS DAILY, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.carbonoffsetsdaily.com/top-stories/carbonabsorbing-tropical-forests-a-potential-gold-mine-4797.htm.
14. See HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 9, at 631.
15. PAULO MOUTINHO ET AL., Introduction, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 7, 8–9 (Paulo Moutino & Stephen Schwartzman eds., 2005).
16. See id. at 9.
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Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries that are undergoing or are
susceptible to engaging in large-scale deforestation have no incentive
18
to curb these emissions.
At present, the market drivers of
19
20
deforestation are simply more profitable for developing nations
21
In the absence of a carbon crediting
than forest conservation.
scheme for developing tropical nations to earn tradable carbon
credits for reducing deforestation, there is little financial incentive for
22
these nations to reduce their deforestation practices. Furthermore,
even if a plan is adopted offering nations financial incentive to
decrease deforestation, certain nations with low deforestation rates
still have little if any incentive to decrease deforestation due to the
23
methodology used for crediting tradable carbon credits.
24
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
25
which allows Annex I nations to meet their Kyoto emissions limits
by investing in emissions reductions projects in developing countries,
currently offers no tradable credits to Annex I countries’ projects that
26
credit tropical nations for reducing deforestation. Consequently, the

17. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1.
18. MOUTINHO, ET AL., supra note 15, at 47–48.
19. The market drivers of deforestation in developing nations include forces more subtle
than logging and “slash and burn” activities. According to a 2007 report from the Center for
International Forestry Research, “[f]orces such as fluctuations in internal commodity process;
agricultural and., more recently, biofuel subsidies; and roads and other infrastructure projects
can encourage forest clearing.” New Report on Deforestation Reveals Problems of Forest
Carbon Payment Systems, ENVTL NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.enn.com/
wildlife/article/26764. See also Lesley K. McAllister, Sustainable Consumption Governance in
the Amazon, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873, 10873–76 (2008) (discussing cattle, soybeans, and biofuels
as the commodity drivers of deforestation in the Amazon).
20. This article focuses on tropical developing nations and, therefore, all references to
“developing nations” refer to tropical developing nations.
21. See Gustavo A. B. da Fonseca et al., No Forest Left Behind, 5 PUB. LIBR. OF SCI.
BIOLOGY 1645, 1645 (2007), available at http://biology.plosjournals.org/archive/15457885/5/8/pdf/10.1371_journal.pbio.0050216-L.pdf.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 12.
25. An Annex 1 nation is an “industrialized” country that has agreed to reduce its
emissions below its 1990 levels as a party of the Kyoto Protocol., whereas Annex 2 nations were
considered developing countries at the time of the agreement in 1992. The following are
classified as Annex 1 countries: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Mumma &
Hodas, supra note 1, at 650.
26. See MOUTINHO, ET AL., supra note 15, at 49.
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international community is failing to capitalize on the international
carbon market, which is a potentially valuable weapon for developing
and developed nations seeking to reduce carbon emissions in the fight
against climate change.
The prevailing scientific consensus today is that to avoid
“dangerous” impacts from climate change, the Earth’s average
27
temperature should not rise more than two degrees Centigrade. To
achieve this goal, Annex I nations must significantly curb their
28
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, emissions reductions
from Annex I nations alone will not be sufficient to prevent a greater
than two degree Centigrade increase in temperature. The Stern
Review determined that even if emissions from developed nations are
reduced to zero by 2050, the developing world would still have to
reduce emissions by at least forty percent from baseline rates to
stabilize global atmospheric carbon enough to prevent a greater than
29
two degree Centigrade increase in the Earth’s average temperature.
Even though offering developing nations an incentive to curb
deforestation rates is not a panacea to the global climate change
problem, it is a significant step toward achieving net emissions
reductions in the developing world.
Part I of this article examines how the Kyoto Protocol currently
incorporates forestry projects as a tool to combat climate change and
how those efforts can be improved to more fully embrace carbon
markets as a mechanism to credit efforts to curb tropical
deforestation. Part II evaluates four potential impediments to
crediting efforts to curb deforestation: additionality, leakage,
permanence, and monitoring. Part III discusses the compensated
reductions plan and the European Commission Joint Research
Centre proposal, two existing proposals to credit developing nations
for reducing emissions from tropical deforestation. Part IV proposes
the Hybrid Compensated Reductions and Preventive Credits plan to
credit developing nations for reducing emissions from tropical

27. A 2° Centigrade increase in global average temperature would still result in significant
adverse impact to climates in certain areas of the world. So, while a 2° Centigrade increase
would not be a “safe” increase in global average temperature, it is a good baseline goal from
which a mitigation policy to combat climate change can be developed. See generally Malte
Meinshausen, What Does a 2°C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief
Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty
Estimates, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 265 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et
al. eds., 2006).
28. See STERN, supra note 2, at 206.
29. Id.
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deforestation.
This proposal combines concepts from the
compensated reductions plan and the European Commission Joint
Research Centre proposals. The hybrid plan offers developing
nations an incentive to curb tropical deforestation rates by providing
the necessary financial support, through enabling carbon credit
trading, to execute and maintain these reductions. The hybrid plan
would also require nations to account for forests at the national level
rather than the project level, and would provide an incentive for
nations with high proportions of remaining forest cover and low
deforestation rates to prevent increases in their domestic
deforestation rate.
I.

CARBON TRADING AND DEFORESTATION

The international carbon market is quickly emerging as a major
30
force in emissions reduction compliance. The carbon trading market
enables entities that wish to exceed their predetermined allotment of
carbon dioxide emissions to purchase credits from another entity that
31
has not exhausted its predetermined quota.
This administrative
mechanism ensures that only a certain amount of carbon dioxide will
be released into the atmosphere and allows the entities to trade and
32
negotiate to remain in compliance. This practice promotes flexibility
and is a cheap and relatively easy method to ensure regulatory
33
compliance. It also provides economic benefits to those entities that
are able to remain within their allotment. This process of buying and
selling is known as carbon trading.
The current carbon market has two principal methods for
34
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The first is a cap and
trade system. Under this system, a regulated source’s GHG emissions
35
are capped by a regulatory body.
Sources whose emissions are
below permitted levels can sell the unused emissions on the carbon

30. Trade in carbon credits increased approximately eighty percent from 2006 to 2007.
Timothy Gardner, Global Carbon Trade Rose 80 Percent Last Year, REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2008,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUKN1832831820080118. The total value of
the carbon market more than doubled its worth in 2008, to approximately $125 billion dollars.
Press Release, Point Carbon, 4.9Gt CO2e Traded in 2008 – Up Massive 83% on Previous Year
(Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.1036167.
31. Jessica
Daly,
Trading
the
Carbon
Market,
CNN,
Sept.
1,
2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/09/01/carbon.trading.pv/index.html.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 44.
35. Id.
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36

market. Likewise, a source whose emissions exceed its allowance
can purchase carbon credits on the carbon market to comply with the
37
regulatory cap.
The other method is an emissions offset program, where
emissions offsets are generated from projects that take place outside
38
of the regulated community. The emissions offsets created by such
projects can be sold to entities seeking to comply with their
39
commitments within the regulated community.
This model is
available under the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol, whereby Annex I
nations can use this “flexibility mechanism” to comply with their
40
capped emissions limits set by the treaty.
The CDM has been
implemented in a wide variety of projects throughout the developing
41
world.
This section first considers the CDM’s objectives and procedures
and examines how this flexible compliance mechanism in the Kyoto
Protocol fails to provide an adequate incentive to curb deforestation
in developing countries. It then considers how crediting reduced
emissions from degradation and deforestation (REDD) in developing
countries can help advance the international effort to combat climate
change.
A. The Clean Development Mechanism
The Kyoto Protocol sets mandatory emissions reductions targets
for Annex I countries that must be met by the end of the first
42
commitment period of 2008-2012. To achieve this goal in a costeffective manner, Annex I nations are able to supplement a portion of
their emission reduction requirements through three flexibility
43
mechanisms: joint implementation (JI), the CDM, and international

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 44–45.
40. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 46.
41. See id. at 52–53 (explaining that a variety of projects have been launched under the
CDM including renewable energy projects, energy efficiency projects, fuel switching, capping
landfill gases, and controlling emissions of certain industrial gases).
42. Id. at 46.
43. Joint implementation (“JI”), defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, offers parties a
cost effective way to comply with the Kyoto Protocol by allowing Annex I countries to earn
emission reduction units (ERUs) from participation in an emission reduction project of another
Annex 1 country. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6. For a JI project to proceed, the
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emissions trading. Under the CDM, Annex I countries can earn
certified emission reductions (CERs) for financing projects that
reduce emissions in developing countries that have no commitments
45
under Kyoto. Annex I countries can use these CERs for compliance
46
with their emissions targets.
Forestry projects now can earn tradable credits through the
CDM and joint implementation, but such projects are limited to
47
afforestation and reforestation.
Afforestation and reforestation
both refer to anthropogenic conversion of non-forested areas into
48
forested land. The difference is that afforestation refers to projects
on land that has not been forested for at least fifty years, while
reforestation refers to the conversion of non-forested areas that have
49
not been forested since December 31, 1989. These afforestation and
reforestation credits are capped for use by Annex I parties at one
percent of their base-year emissions or five percent of emissions
50
during the entire five-year commitment period from 2008 to 2012.
The CDM is governed by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is supervised by the
51
CDM Executive Board. The Conference of the Parties has declared
that the triad of mechanisms (JI, CDM, and emissions trading) were
intended to enable flexibility in compliance efforts but also were

reduced emissions must exceed those that would have occurred without the project. Id. Annex
I parties may not exclusively rely on JI credits to meet their targets. Id.
44. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 46.
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id. As of this writing, there are more than 4200 projects in progress under the CDM,
including 1873 registered projects and an additional 109 projects requesting registration. See
CDM Statistics, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).
47. See Bernhard Schlamadinger et al., Should We Include Avoidance of Deforestation in
the International Response to Climate Change?, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 53, 53 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005).
48. Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, supra note 1, at 643.
49. Id. Some commentators have argued that many tropical forest species can survive in
the “new growth” or “secondary forest” after the old forest areas have been cut. Erik Stokstad,
A Second Chance for Biodiversity, SCIENCE, June 13, 2008, at 1436. However, regardless of regrowth, there is a vital need to conserve the remaining old-growth tropical forests. "Primary
forest is even harder to replace than many researchers expect," says Toby Gardner of the
Federal University of Lavras in Brazil. Id. "For many species, once these virgin forests have
gone there is nowhere else to go." Id. Many species, such as the harlequin toad, require oldgrowth forest habitat to survive. Id.
50. Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, supra note 1, at 658.
51. MEINHARD DOELLE, FROM HOT AIR TO ACTION? CLIMATE CHANGE, COMPLIANCE
AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 29–34 (2005).
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52

meant to supplement domestic actions.
The CDM allows
industrialized countries that are parties to Kyoto to invest in
53
emission-reducing products of non-party developing countries. The
purpose of this mechanism is to build relations between industrial and
developing countries and encourage a sustainable environment by
allowing industrialized countries to reduce carbon emissions at a
54
lower cost. This mechanism also is beneficial in that it allows nonparty countries to become involved in the overall goal of reducing
carbon emissions while enabling exposure to resources and
technology that will encourage development of their own countries.
Therefore, the CDM ultimately seeks to “bridge the political divide
between developed and developing countries as their industries take
55
action together.”
Nevertheless, the requirements of a CDM project are so
stringent that the benefits are impossible for some applicants to
56
obtain. The following issues must be considered for a CDM project:
(1) project participants and other parties involved; (2) technologies
used in the project; (3) baseline, validation, and verification
methodologies; (4) location of the project and status of the host
country authorization letter; (5) ownership of CER’s; (6)
additionality; (7) environmental and/or community development
benefits resulting from the project; (8) monitoring; and (9) a
57
verification plan.
The strict requirements of the CDM process begin with a project
design document submission to the Executive Board, a ten member
58
panel which is part of the UNFCCC. This project design document
contains a detailed description of the proposed project and how it will
59
reduce GHG emissions.
To gain approval, the project design

52. David Takacs, Carbon Into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation,
and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W. N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 53 (2009).
53. Id. at 40.
54. See id. at 81.
55. Jack Cogen, Chief Exec. Officer, Natsource L.L.C., Why the US Needs Access to
International & Domestic Carbon Markets, remarks at Carbon Markets Insights Americas
Conference
(Oct.
30,
2007),
available
at
http://www.natsource.com/uploads/
news/Jack%20Cogen%20-%20CarbonForum%20LONG%20Remarks.doc.
56. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM: 2008 IN BRIEF 5–6 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
publications/08_cdm_in_brief.pdf.
57. Id. at 4–5.
58. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 49.
59. Id.
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document must demonstrate that the proposed project actually
creates emissions reductions that are “additional” to any reductions
60
that would have occurred in a “business as usual” setting.
The
developing country that hosts this project must also write a letter of
61
approval acknowledging the project. If the project is approved, or
“registered,” the project is then implemented and monitored to
62
ensure that there have been real emissions reductions. The GHG
emissions reductions are analyzed and submitted for approval as
63
CERs, which are issued for each ton of carbon dioxide reduced.
Despite its laudable intentions, the CDM is an ineffective tool
for fighting tropical deforestation. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
has recently criticized the CDM, arguing that one in five carbon
credits issued by the UNFCCC are going to projects that may have
64
actually increased carbon emissions. WWF contends that the CDM
is essentially funding projects that would have proceeded regardless
of the CDM project, and, consequently, most CDM projects lack
65
“additionality.” For example, the World Bank recently approved
funding for a 4,000-megawatt coal plant in India that will emit 25.7
66
Shockingly, Annex I
million tons of carbon dioxide per year.
nations will be able to invest in this proposed coal plant to earn
tradable credits via the CDM, which will allow these nations to
67
increase their carbon emissions domestically. The justification for
this project is that it is deemed to be a “super-critical” coal-generating
technology that will make this plant more efficient than others in

60. Id. at 49–50.
61. Id. at 50.
62. Id.
63. Id. For a discussion of the CDM process and recommendations to improve its
efficiency, see generally Mindy Nigoff, The Clean Development Mechanism: Does the Current
Structure Facilitate Kyoto Protocol Compliance?, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 249 (2006);
Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2008).
64. Michael Szabo, A Fifth of U.N. Carbon Credits May Be Bogus, REUTERS, Nov. 29,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL2926519020071129?pageNumber
=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true.
65. Id.
66. David Wheeler, Tata Ultra Mega Mistake: The IFC Should Not Get Burned by Coal,
CARMA BLOG (Mar. 13, 2008), http://carma.org/blog/tata-ultra-mega-mistake-the-ifc-shouldnot-get-burned-by-coal/.
67. See JUDSON JAFFE & ROBERT N. STAVINS, THE HARVARD PROJECT ON INT’L
CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, LINKAGE OF TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURE 12–19 (2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
StavinsWeb6.pdf.
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68

India. However, many argue the end result of this project will result
in no net reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, and will ultimately
result in a net increase in carbon emissions, especially since the region
of India that the plant will serve has a very outdated power grid to
69
transport the electricity.
Another criticism of the CDM is that it is only available on the
70
project level. Given the stringent requirements any CDM project
faces in demonstrating that it will result in net emissions reductions,
this project-level focus significantly limits the CDM’s scope of
71
potential projects.
One of the CDM’s most glaring weaknesses,
however, is its failure to acknowledge projects in developing countries
that reduce deforestation. The Environmental Defense Fund argues
that giving developing tropical nations market-based incentives for
reducing national emissions from deforestation is one of the five
necessary adjustments to make the CDM a practical tool in the fight
72
against climate change. However, due to the criticisms noted above,
the CDM’s overall structure, and its controversial negotiations in the
73
Marrakesh Accords, the CDM is not an effective mechanism for
74
reducing emissions from degradation and deforestation (REDD).
Thus, an alternative approach must be developed to address this
growing international crisis.
B. Reduced Emissions from Degradation and Deforestation
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol established targets and timetables
for emissions reductions and flexibility mechanisms to help nations
75
meet their prescribed targets.
Along with the CDM, JI, and

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See JOS COZIJNSEN ET AL., CDM AND THE POST-2012 FRAMEWORK 6 (Envtl Defense
Fund, 2007), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/6838_ED_Vienna_CDM%20Paper_
8_22_07.pdf.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 7.
73. THE MARRAKESH ACCORDS AND THE MARRAKESH DECLARATION, available at
http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf (2001). For additional discussion of these
controversial negotiations, see infra Part IV.C.
74. See Rogerio F. Pinto & Jose Antonio Puppim de Oliveira, Implementation Challenges
in Protecting the Global Environmental Commons: The Case of Climate Change Policies in
Brazil, 28 PUBLIC ADMIN. DEV. 340, 346–47 (discussing how CDM projects in Brazil have
clashed with local interests and values).
75. See ERIN C. MYERS MADEIRA, REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND
DEGRADATION (REDD) IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES
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76

emissions trading, a fourth mechanism—REDD—was proposed.
This option was deemed to have the potential to contribute the
77
greatest and most immediate carbon stock impact. Furthermore,
since REDD encourages the abatement of deforestation, it would not
only reduce carbon emissions but also would assist in sustainable
78
development benefits such as biodiversity conservation; watershed
protection; reduction of runoff, siltation, and flooding; protection of
79
fisheries; and sustained incomes for local communities.
After this mechanism was established, research concluded that
REDD activities could not be isolated and, thus, that the
80
mechanism’s specific effects could not be determined. Moreover,
there was significant disagreement regarding how REDD could meet
these target emission rates. The Seventh Conference of the Parties
81
(COP 7) determined there were various uncertainties about the
actual rate of deforestation emissions and the ability to monitor such
82
Consequently, REDD projects have been excluded from
rates.

FACING THE INCORPORATION OF REDD INTO MARKET-BASED CLIMATE POLICIES 8 (2008),
available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-Rpt-REDD_final.2.20.09.pdf.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Id. at 14.
78. Due to the thousands of acres of rainforest destroyed or severely degraded each year,
several hundred species are driven to extinction, the majority of which are never documented by
science. Sustainable Amazon, BRAZILIAN EMBASSY – WASHINGTON D.C., June 17, 2007,
http://www.brasilemb.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65&Itemid=111.
Moreover, there are more than one million species of animals in the Amazon. Into the Depths
of the Amazon–Fauna, http://library.thinkquest.org/21395/textonly/fauna/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2009). Scientists have documented that the Amazon is the home to jaguars, harpy eagles,
dolphins, manatees, sloths, and monkeys. It also hosts 950 bird species, 3000 freshwater fish
species, 5000 species of trees, and the largest diversity of butterflies. Sustainable Amazon,
BRAZILIAN EMBASSY – WASHINGTON D.C., June 17, 2007, http://www.brasilemb.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65&Itemid=111. In addition to the impressive
array of animal life in the Amazon, a reported 1300 medicinal species can be found in this great
forest, creating a “natural medicine chest.”
Antibiotics, narcotics, abortive drugs,
contraceptives, anticoagulants, fungicides, anesthetics, muscular relaxants, and anti-diarrheal
and anti-viral medications are developed from these species. Id. Moreover, only 90 of the 1,300
medicinal species are commercially exploited by the pharmaceutical industry, again illustrating
how invaluable these rainforests are, and how much we have to learn about them. Id.
79. MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 26.
80. Id. at 22.
81. U.N
Framework
Convention
on
Climate
Change,
Kyoto
Protocol,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Dec. 28, 2009) (“The detailed rules
for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001, and are
called the ‘Marrakesh Accords.’”).
82. Annie Petsonk, Rewarding Reductions, Realizing Results: Legal Options for Making
Compensated Reductions a Reality, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 119,
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83

regulatory markets and are limited to the voluntary carbon market.
Voluntary carbon markets are utilized by buyers who are more
interested in reducing their environmental impact or improving their
environmental image, as opposed to remaining in compliance with a
84
law or regulation.
In a voluntary market, credits are sold at a
85
fraction of the price of credits sold in regulatory markets.
86
Spurred by efforts of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, the
2005 COP 11 proposed to offer developing countries access to the
87
carbon market through credits generated from REDD activities.
The UNFCC later instituted a two-year experimental period to
88
examine the possible benefits of REDD. In 2008, the World Bank
announced the countries that will participate in this preliminary
89
exhibition of REDD.
In 2007, at COP 13 in Bali, REDD was again listed among the
90
possible mitigation methods to achieve emissions targets.
The
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is researching the building
capacity for REDD in developing countries as well as testing a
performance-based payment program to lay a foundation of positive
91
incentives and financing in the future. The negotiations at COP 14
in Pozna in 2008 also included a thorough consideration and
92
endorsement of REDD. In December 2009, REDD was revisited at

121
(Paulo
Moutinho
&
Stephan
Schwartzman
eds.,
2005),
available
at
http://www.edf.org/documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf.
83. See id. at 28.
84. See generally id.19–20 (discussing application of voluntary carbon markets to countries
not parties to Kyoto treaty).
85. See id. at 27.
86. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations consists of more than forty developing nations
that support the use of carbon credits to curb tropical deforestation. See generally Coalition for
Rainforest Nations, http://www.rainforestcoalition.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).
87. Tropical Forest Group, A History of Climate Change and Tropical Forest Negotiations
(Aug. 2007), http://www.tropicalforestgroup.org/articles/history.html (“At COP 11 in 2005, the
idea of saving forests to prevent GHG emissions got a new title- REDD.”).
88. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 27.
89. Id. at 28. These countries include nations in Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Madagascar), Latin America (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana,
Mexico, and Panama), and Asia (Nepal, Lao PDR, and Vietnam). These pilot countries will
establish baseline emissions, exemplify monitoring strategies, and provide a glimpse of REDD
in action overall to be used as a foundation for future implementation. Id.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id. at 28.
92. See Richard Horsch, Poznan: Progress or Procrastination?, 11 INT’L ENVTL. L. NEWS
1, 3–5 (2009) (noting that there was consensus at Pozna that REDD should be an important
component of the post-Kyoto framework).
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93

COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark. REDD proposals were discussed
extensively at COP 15 and language was incorporated into the
Copenhagen Accord recognizing the importance of REDD and the
94
need to establish a financing mechanism for it. As of this writing,
however, developing countries remain ineligible to earn tradable
carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol for curbing deforestation.
The many proposed benefits of REDD projects have been
diluted by an array of criticisms including methodological concerns,
95
indigenous peoples’ concerns, and environmental groups’ concerns.
96
Some of the leading methodological concerns were (1) leakage, (2)
97
enforceability, (3) feasibility and accuracy of monitoring and control,

93. See Norton Rose, United Nations Climate Change Conference, http://
www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/2009/pub19337.aspx?page=all&lang=en-gb (last
visited Dec. 28, 2009).
94
See Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, arts. 6, 8 available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf.
95. While beyond the scope of this Article, a thorough evaluation of potential impacts to
indigenous peoples is indispensable for REDD to be successfully implemented into a postKyoto regime. Tropical rainforests are not only a home to these peoples, but also offer a way of
life. They serve a cultural and spiritual purpose, in addition to providing food, medicines, and
shelter. However, as logging and predation continue, the land they call home is being
threatened. Indigenous peoples have relied on and co-existed with the resources of the
rainforest for decades. International Expert Group Meeting on Indigenous Peoples and
Climate Change (April 3, 2008) (conference paper available at United Nations Permanent
Forum
on
Indigenous
Peoples
Document
Library),
available
at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/EGM_A42.html. While they have learned to use
rainforest resources in an efficient and sustainable way, contributing very little to mankind’s
ecological footprints on Earth, indigenous peoples nonetheless are positioned on the front lines
to endure the greatest impacts from climate change and deforestation. Id. According to the
anthropologist Darcy Riberio, “55 indigenous populations vanished in the first half of the 20th
century.”
GREENPEACE, BRIEFING: DENI DEMARCATION 1 (2003), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/deni-demarcation-thedemarcat.pdf. Since there is such a delicate relationship of reliance and coexistence, drastic
changes in these pristine forests severely affect all aspects of life for the indigenous peoples who
live there. Deforestation is also forcing indigenous people to migrate to cities, which leaves
these individuals in urban slums with limited opportunities for adaptation to an entirely foreign
way of life. Press Release, United Nations University, Indigenous People Hardest Hit by
Climate Change Describe Impacts (Apr. 2, 2008) (on file with United Nations University).
Indigenous people are often the victims of human right violations, displacements, and conflicts
due to “expropriation of ancestral lands and forests for biofuel plantations (soya, sugar-cane,
jatropha, oil-palm, corn, etc.), as well as for carbon sink and renewable energy projects
(hydropower dams, geothermal plants).” Id. These actions occur “without the free, prior and
informed consent of [these] people.” Id.
96. See infra Part II.B.
97. See Roger Harrabin, Forest Plan may “Fuel Corruption,” BBC NEWS, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/7669215.stm (“We should not underestimate the scale of
challenge faced in some forest nations where governance is virtually non-existent.”); New
Report on Deforestation, supra note 19 (“[R]educing carbon emissions from forests will require
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(4) natural and anthropogenic disturbances, (5) baseline setting, and
98
(6) additionality. A major concern of indigenous peoples regarding
REDD projects was forest property rights. This concern was borne
from experiences in which payment for carbon services benefit
corrupt officials or local elites, which ultimately harms the individual
99
communities that make their homes in these forests.
Finally,
environmental groups opposed the notion that wealthy nations could
try to circumvent their obligations to reduce emissions under Kyoto
100
by simply investing in REDD projects.
They feared that these
wealthy nations would use REDD projects as a loophole to “buy their
101
way out” of making permanent emissions reductions at home.
There also was a concern that investing in REDD projects could
decrease investment in energy abatement technology, which
prompted environmental groups, and consequently many
102
governments, to disfavor avoided deforestation crediting.
Despite these concerns, REDD continues to be accepted in
principle and implemented outside the Kyoto compliance regime. In
September 2008, the UN-REDD Programme was launched, which is a
collaboration between the UN Environment Programme, the UN
Food and Agricultural Organization, and the UN Development
103
Programme. A pilot project under the UN-REDD Programme was
announced in March 2009 in which the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, and Vietnam will
receive $18 million to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation and
104
support indigenous peoples’ interests in the forests.
Bolivia,
Panama, Paraguay, and Zambia also have sought funding from the
105
UN-REDD Programme.

strengthening the weak governance mechanisms that have long proven unable to enforce many
existing prohibitions on forest clearing.”).
98. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 29.
99. See id; New Report on Deforestation, supra note 19 (“Deeply ingrained and routinely
corrupt government practices often favor large corporate interests over community rights to
forest resources.”).
100. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 29.
101. See Laurence, supra note 3, at 20, 23.
102. Roger A. Sedjo & Brent Sohngen, Carbon Credits for Avoided Deforestation 1
(Resources
for
the
Future
Discussion
Paper
2007),
available
at
http://
www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-07-47.pdf.
103. UN scheme provides $18 million to five countries to slash emissions, create jobs, UN
NEWS
CENTRE,
Mar.
18,
2009,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
30221&Cr=deforestation&Cr1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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II. CHALLENGES IN CREDITING REDD PROJECTS
Whenever a plan to award tradable carbon credits to a
developing country for REDD activities is considered, four issues are
typically
raised:
monitoring,
leakage,
additionality,
and
106
Any effective plan to credit REDD activities must
permanence.
address these four issues. While monitoring can be addressed
independently, leakage, additionality, and permanence are often
interdependent, and any effective REDD crediting scheme must
107
effectively balance these three issues.
A. Monitoring
The ability to quantify and verify tropical deforestation is
108
essential to any REDD crediting scheme. Satellite data is the best
available option to measure deforestation rates to set baselines and
109
track deforestation after baselines have been set. The problem with
satellite monitoring is not a lack of scientific accuracy; rather, it stems
from developing countries lacking the financial and technological
110
resources necessary to conduct this type of monitoring. As of 2006,
Brazil and India were the only developing nations with the necessary
111
infrastructure to monitor their forests via satellite.
An effective forest monitoring system must cover a vast expanse
112
of forest area repeatedly to effectively track deforestation rates.
Along with satellite imagery, actual field verification is necessary to
113
validate the accuracy of satellite imagery.
However, field
verification is only feasible in a limited number of areas. For larger

106. See Marcio Santilli et al., Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol: An Editorial
Essay, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 47, 49–50 (Paulo Moutinho &
Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005) (explaining the nature of these four issues and how they relate
to crediting reductions in tropical deforestation).
107. See id.
108. R. DeFries et al., Monitoring Tropical Deforestation for Emerging Carbon Markets, in
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 35, 35 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan
Schwartzman
eds.,
2005),
available
at
http://www.edf.org/documents/4930_
TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (explaining that most tropical nations do not currently have the capabilities to
effectively monitor their rainforests in order to carry out a compensated reduction scheme that
shares the same monitoring methods as the hybrid plan).
112. Id. The hybrid plan operates on the national level; therefore, it is necessary for a
monitoring system to be capable of overseeing an entire nation’s tropical forests.
113. Id. (explaining that this is essential to verify that there is no discrepancy between the
satellite imagery and the actual forest degradation on the ground).
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expanses of forest, overflights and extremely high resolution imagery
114
is necessary due to lack of access by land. In reality, no one method
of monitoring can be effective for monitoring all tropical forests;
therefore, different methods must be adopted to effectively monitor
115
different forests.
Another issue in monitoring is determining what constitutes
116
“deforestation.”
Experts suggest that two factors must be
established when analyzing deforestation. First, a monitoring system
must identify what forest degradation is to be monitored (e.g.,
selective logging, clear-cut logging, slash and burn tactics, land
117
conversion, etc.).
Second, a monitoring system must set forth the
118
minimum disturbance size that will register on the monitoring scale.
B. Leakage
Leakage is the concept that if deforestation is halted in one
project area, the market demands will simply shift deforestation to
another unregulated area, thus nullifying the benefit of emissions
119
reductions in the project area. Leakage has been a vexing problem
120
Because the CDM operates at the project level
for the CDM.
instead of the national level, the concern is that deforestation will
simply move to another area outside of the project area within the
121
host country.
Leakage also presents a problem for forestry projects that
operate on the national level. Even if a REDD scheme is
implemented at the national level, there is still potential for
international leakage, as the market drivers of deforestation may
simply shift borders to a neighboring nation that does not participate
122
in a REDD crediting scheme. For example, one commentator has

114. R. DeFries et al., supra note 108, at 40.
115. Id.
116. Id. The IPCC report on Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry includes multiple
definitions of what constitutes “deforestation.” The clearest definition is “permanent removal of
forest cover,” and “forest” is considered to be land covered by more than ten percent tree cover.
Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (“[T]he minimum size would depend on the types of forest disturbances included
and the feasibility of accurate detection by available satellite sensors.”).
119. Sedjo & Sohngen, supra note 102, at 6.
120. See Santilli et al., supra note 106, at 49.
121. See id.
122. See G.A. Silvia-Chavez, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Tropical
Deforestation by Applying Compensated Reduction to Bolivia, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION
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posed a hypothetical scenario in which Brazil adopts a REDD
123
Under these
crediting scheme and neighboring Bolivia does not.
circumstances, the market drivers of deforestation would simply jump
124
the border to Bolivia to bypass Brazilian conservation laws.
Because any REDD scheme is likely to be voluntary for developing
tropical nations, there may be many opportunities for cross-boundary
125
international leakage.
C. Additionality
Additionality is the principle that if a project seeks to earn
credits in a carbon market, it should create carbon reductions that
126
would not have occurred in the absence of the financed project.
127
The CDM has very strict additionality requirements that have
128
Under the CDM, additionality
rendered the CDM ineffective.
often presents a technical challenge for forestry projects because the
strict criteria make it difficult to identify whether a forestry project’s
emissions reductions would have occurred in the absence of the
129
proposed project.
Although the CDM currently involves only afforestation and
reforestation projects, the same problem occurs when crediting
reductions in deforestation. Because any REDD crediting scheme
requires the credit accounting baselines to be set according to historic
130
deforestation rates, it is impossible to predict with complete
accuracy whether deforestation will occur in a particular nation at the
same or higher rate in the future. Thus, it is impossible to state that a
nation’s decreased deforestation over a commitment period was
solely attributable to its participation in the REDD crediting scheme.
CLIMATE CHANGE 73, 84 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005), available
at http://www.edf.org/documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ ClimateChange.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Sedjo & Sohngen, supra note 102, at 7.
126. See T.C. Heller, Additionality, Transactional Barriers and the Political Economy of
Climate Change, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE
203, 211 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1999).
127. See generally Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 1, at 46–51 (describing the CDM and its
current function within the Kyoto Protocol).
128. Andrew W. Mitchell et al., Forests NOW in the Fight Against Climate Change 13
(Forest Foresight Report 1.v3 2008) (arguing the CDM’s burdensome certification requirements
and high transaction costs have resulted in less than one percent of carbon market investments
in reforestation projects, and not one fully commercial project has been approved to date).
129. Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, supra note 1, at 670.
130. Santilli et al., supra note 106, at 49.
AND
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There is always the possibility that the decreases in tropical
deforestation were attributable to some other source. As discussed in
Part IV of this Article, addressing both additionally and leakage on
the international level can be problematic.
D. Permanence
The issue of permanence speaks to the security of emissions
131
offsets.
One major question regarding permanence is whether
avoided deforestation at one time will continue to be avoided in the
132
future. One of the reasons deforestation projects were not included
in the CDM is that some feared carbon sequestered in a forest project
would be released to the atmosphere at a future date due to natural
133
or human disturbances, such as fire and future deforestation. This
concern prompted the flawed argument that protection of carbon
stocks at one point may lead to greater emissions from these carbon
134
stocks in the future. Because of the purported ephemeral nature of
conserved forest, current carbon markets such as the CDM issue
temporary credits for forestry projects, which eventually expire after
135
a set number of years and must be repurchased.
This system has
136
left many potential investors wary.
III. EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS TO CREDIT REDD PROJECTS
Initial proposals to include deforestation in the Kyoto Protocol
137
were shunned.
Nevertheless, the potential benefits from
implementing a REDD scheme prompted several new proposals for
successful application of REDD. The two leading proposals to credit
decreases in deforestation are (1) The Compensated Reductions Plan
and (2) The European Commission Joint Research Centre Proposal.
This section analyzes these proposals and concludes that each
proposal is hampered by significant limitations.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 50.
Sedjo & Sohngen, supra note 102, at 6.
See Schlamadinger et al., supra note 47, at 55.
See id.
Mitchell et al., supra note 128, at 32.
Id.
Laurence, supra note 3, at 20.
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A. Compensated Reductions Plan
138

for tackling tropical
The most widely regarded proposal
139
Created by
deforestation is the Compensated Reductions Plan.
NGO and academic experts, this proposal gained support in the
international community due to the Coalition of Rainforest Nations’
140
lobbying efforts at COP 11 in Montreal in 2005. As a result, at COP
11, a team was assembled to prepare and submit a proposal to the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to study the
141
potential benefits of reducing emissions from deforestation.
The proposed compensated reductions plan awards tradable
carbon credits to tropical nations for reducing their emissions from
142
deforestation.
Under the compensated reductions proposal,
developing nations voluntarily elect to reduce their national emissions
143
from deforestation over a span of years. A nation’s reductions are
then compared against a national baseline, which is calculated by
averaging that nation’s annual deforestation rate over a period of
144
time. A nation that successfully reduces its deforestation from the
historic baseline during the commitment period receives carbon
certificates similar to CERs under the CDM, which may be sold to
145
governments or private investors.
Although the decision to
participate is voluntary, a nation that receives carbon certificates is
deemed to have entered into a binding agreement not to increase
146
deforestation in future comment periods.
With regard to the additionality issue, the proponents of
compensated reductions assert that tropical deforestation is
increasing internationally, with increases occurring at alarming rates
147
in certain areas. Therefore, it is easy to demonstrate that sustained
reductions in deforestation would not occur in the absence of

138. Moutinho & Schwartzman, supra note 15, at 9.
139. See generally Santilli et al., supra note 18, at 47–49 (discussing how compensated
reduction can both reduce substantial carbon emissions from deforestation and encourage
developing countries to participate in the Kyoto Protocol framework).
140. Laurence, supra note 3, at 21.
141. MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 68.
142. Santilli et al., supra note 106, at 48–49.
143. Id. The initial proposal was for the reductions to occur during the first commitment
period under Kyoto. Id.
144. Id. at 49.
145. Id. at 48–49.
146. See id. at 49.
147. See id. at 49–50.
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148

compensated reductions.
The logic follows that any reduction in
deforestation rates will be “additional” in that it would not occur in
the absence of the compensated reductions plan, as it is very unlikely
that deforestation rates at either the national or international levels
will decrease without implementing a crediting scheme such as
compensated reductions.
As for the permanence issue, the drafters argue that the
permanence of carbon credits will be assured by the stipulation that
nations that receive tradable carbon credits in one period, and then
increase deforestation in the next commitment period, will have to
mitigate any increased deforestation as a prerequisite to earning
149
future carbon credits.
The compensated reductions plan also
proposes a system of “banking” carbon credits, whereby a portion of
the earned reductions credits are tradable upon receipt, while another
portion of the credits are “banked” and are unable to be traded until
150
a future commitment period.
The goal of banking credits is to
151
ensure actual emissions offsets.
One of the main advantages of the compensated reductions
proposal is its ability to account for leakage at the national level.
Unlike project-based systems such as the CDM, accounting for
deforestation at the national level prevents a nation from receiving
carbon credits by reducing deforestation in one region of the country
while simultaneously increasing deforestation in another region of the
152
country.
This national level system does not completely cure the
problem of leakage, however, and may create an entirely different
153
leakage problem: international leakage.
The compensated reductions proponents maintain that
international leakage is a much larger problem under current Kyoto
154
rules. They contend that because Annex I nations are able to earn
credit for maintaining their forest stands at home, the demand for
155
tropical timber increases as a result. Thus, by offering developing
148. See Santilli et al., supra note 106 (arguing that this state of affairs remains true despite
the prediction that deforestation rates will eventually level off and slow as tropical forests
disappear).
149. See id. at 48–49.
150. See id. at 50.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 49.
153. See id. For a discussion of leakage, see generally supra notes 119–125 and
accompanying text.
154. See Santilli et al., supra note 106.
155. See id.
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tropical nations an incentive to reduce their emissions from
deforestation, Annex I nations will begin to combat the problem of
international leakage by limiting the restrictive influence of the
156
tropical timber market on developing nations outside of Annex I.
Moreover, they argue that international leakage will be a problem
157
only if few nations elect to participate in compensated reductions.
There is a small group of tropical nations that likely would not
participate in compensated reductions, and these are the nations with
high remaining forest cover and low rates of deforestation (HFLD
158
nations). Because HFLD nations have little incentive to participate
in a compensated reductions scheme, these nations will presumably
face significant pressures from the market drivers of deforestation
159
once other tropical nations begin earning tradable REDD credits.
A 2007 study suggested that tropical nations should be divided into
four different categories according to tropical forest cover and
160
deforestation rate.
The following table illustrates this
161
categorization.

156. See id. at 50.
157. See id. at 49 (arguing that the theoretical timber market shift from Brazil to Bolivia,
which would presumably occur if only Brazil adopted compensated reductions in South
America, would not occur if Bolivia also adopted compensated reductions).
158. “HFLD” nations include Panama, Columbia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru,
Belize, French Guiana, Gabon, Guyana, Suriname, Bhutan and Zambia. See da Fonseca et al.,
supra note 21, at 1645.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. This table is a modified version of “Figure 1” found in da Fonseca et al., supra note 21,
at 1645.
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High Deforestation Rate
(>0.22%/yr)

Low Deforestation Rate
(<0.22%/yr)

Low Forest Cover
(<50%)

High Forest Cover
(>50%)

Quadrant I

Quadrant III

E.g., Guatemala,
Thailand, Madagasgar

E.g., Papua New
Guinea, Brazil

High potential for
REDD credits

High Potential for
REDD credits

High potential for
reforestation payments
under CDM
Quadrant II

Low potential for
reforestation payments
under CDM
Quadrant IV – HFLD
Nations

E.g., Dominican
Republic, Angola,
Vietnam

E.g., Suriname, Gabon,
Belize

Low potential for
REDD credits

Low potential for
REDD credits

High potential for
reforestation payments
under CDM

Low potential for
reforestation payments
under CDM
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According to the aforementioned study, Quadrant I nations are
those with less than fifty percent of their original forest cover
remaining and a high current deforestation rate (i.e., greater than a
162
0.22% yearly average). Quadrant I nations have high potential to
earn credits for reducing deforestation under a framework such as
163
compensated reductions. These nations also have high potential to
164
earn credits under the CDM through reforestation projects.
Quadrant II nations are those nations with less than fifty percent of
165
their original forest cover and a low deforestation rate.
These
nations have little potential to earn substantial credits under the
compensated reductions plan, but a high potential for earning
166
reforestation credits under the CDM. However, as noted in Part I

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of this article, the CDM is an ineffective solution to the tropical
167
deforestation crisis.
Quadrant III nations are those with more than fifty percent of
their original forest cover remaining and a high deforestation rate
168
(greater than 0.22% of national forest cover deforested per year).
169
According to the
Brazil is an example of a Quadrant III nation.
study, Quadrant III nations have a high potential to earn credits
under the compensated reductions framework, and a low potential for
170
reforestation payments under the CDM.
It seems, however, that
this CDM analysis is too broadly construed because a nation the size
of Brazil could earn significant credits under the CDM if the CDM
171
were a viable mechanism for large-scale carbon credit distribution.
Finally, Quadrant IV nations, which represent the HFLD
nations, have more than fifty percent of their original forest cover
172
remaining and a low deforestation rate. Quadrant IV nations have
little potential to earn tradable credits in a system such as the
compensated reductions plan that solely compensates based on
173
reductions in deforestation. These nations also have little potential
174
to earn reforestation credits under the CDM.
These HFLD nations represent eighteen percent of stored
175
tropical forest carbon worldwide. Because these nations have little
incentive under the proposed compensated reductions plan or the
CDM to preserve their forests, HFLD nations are likely candidates
for increased deforestation if a REDD crediting scheme is adopted
that does not reward: (1) nations that have successfully conserved
their forests thus far, or (2) nations that have been successful in
176
recent years in curbing deforestation.
The drivers of tropical
deforestation are mobile, and international leakage is a serious threat
177
to the effectiveness of any REDD crediting scheme. Therefore, it is
important that any REDD scheme issue preventive credits to HFLD

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See da Fonseca et al., supra note 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id. at 1645–46.
Id. at 1645.
See da Fonseca et al., supra note 21.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 1645.
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nations to ensure they have adequate incentive to maintain their
forests in the face of increased pressure to harvest due to
178
international leakage.
If the international reference emission rate is set at one-third of
the global average deforestation, projections suggest that crediting at
a modest $10 per ton of carbon dioxide reduced could be worth
approximately $365 million annually for seven of the eleven HFLD
179
nations.
Setting the international reference emission rate at onehalf the global average deforestation would mean that ten HFLD
180
nations could earn approximately $630 million dollars annually. If
the global average rate is used as the baseline, all eleven HFLD
nations could profit approximately $1.8 billion annually from
181
preventive credits.
While issuing preventive credits to HFLD nations is an essential
tool to combat international leakage, there are still some potential
drawbacks. One argument is that issuing preventive credits may flood
the carbon market with credits, thus lowering the overall price of the
credits, which could diminish many nations’ incentives to reduce
182
deforestation. However, when preventive credits are viewed in light
of the percentage of forest carbon credits they represent, it is a small
183
portion of the international market. Initial approximations suggest
preventive credits will only account for 1.3% – 6.5% of developing
184
nations’ credited deforestation reductions.
Furthermore, as the
global demand for carbon credits increases, inflation of carbon credits
185
becomes less likely to occur.
The primary concern with issuing preventive credits is
186
additionality.
Issuing preventive credits may in fact lead to what
187
some critics have dubbed as “hot air.” If HFLD nations are issued
preventive credits, and sell these credits to Annex I countries that
need the credits to meet their regulatory cap obligations, then the
total quantity of emissions may actually be larger than would have

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See da Fonseca et al., supra note 21, at 1645–46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
da Fonseca et al., supra note 21.
Id.
See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 35.
Id. at 29.
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otherwise been allowed. That is, if Annex I countries are allowed to
pollute over their designated cap by purchasing these preventive
credits, while at the same time, the developing nation is not actually
decreasing emissions from deforestation below their business as usual
189
rate, there is no net reduction in emissions. However, this problem
must be considered relative to any plan that simply credits reduced
deforestation (e.g., compensated reductions).
While there may be a problem obtaining net emission reductions
with preventive credits, the same is true if international leakage takes
place. For example, if Brazil adopts compensated reductions, and the
market drivers of deforestation simply leak to an HFLD nation such
as Columbia, there is no net reduction in emissions. Given this same
scenario, when both Brazil and Columbia have a financial incentive
via carbon credits to limit deforestation, both nations will presumably
take proactive measures to ensure that deforestation is sufficiently
reduced and regulated. Thus, the market drivers of deforestation will
not have a favorable environment in which to continue deforestation
efforts.
The problem with additionality and preventive credits can be
further ameliorated by capping the quantity of preventive credits that
are tradable in any one commitment period. Capping the trade of
preventive credits in each commitment period limits the number of
credits that do not represent actual carbon “offsets.” This approach
mandates that the vast majority of traded REDD carbon credits
represent actual reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from nations
that reduce their emissions from deforestation. If an HFLD nation
can only trade a certain portion of its preventive credits during any
one commitment period, the effects of this “hot air” will be far less
significant.
Finally, participating governments in the REDD crediting
scheme should receive adequate monetary compensation from
trading credits to address the problems associated with deforestation
in very poor regions of a country (e.g., slash and burn farming), where
190
residents exploit forests out of necessity. For example, portions of
the compensation earned from the sale of carbon credits could be

188. Id. at 29–30.
189. Id.
190. See Thomas P. Tomich et al., Balancing Agricultural Development and Environmental
Objectives: Assessing Tradeoffs in the Humid Tropics, in SLASH-AND-BURN AGRICULTURE:
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 415, 437 (Cheryl A. Palm et al. eds., 2005).
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applied to economic development projects in the poorer rural regions
of Brazil.
B. European Commission Joint Research Centre Proposal
Another proposal to address emissions from tropical
deforestation is the European Commission Joint Research Centre
191
(“JRC”) proposal.
Like compensated reductions, this proposal
192
This plan
addresses deforestation at the national level.
differentiates between intact and non-intact forests, as it accounts for
both deforestation and forest degradation, which is referred to as
193
forest “conversion.”
Like compensated reductions, the JRC
194
proposal establishes national baselines.
However, in addition to
national baselines, the JRC proposal also establishes a global
195
conversion baseline. The reason for establishing two baselines is to
reduce forest conversion in nations where significant deforestation
and degradation is occurring, and to prevent deforestation and
196
degradation in nations where it has yet to occur on a major scale.
Thus, the international baseline is used to distinguish nations with low
197
forest conversion rates from those with high forest conversion rates.
The JRC proposal implements satellite technology to monitor forest
198
conversion.
In calculating carbon emission reductions, the carbon
stock of non-intact forests is considered to contain half of the carbon
199
stock of intact forests.
The JRC proposal creates two separate accounting systems: one
system for nations with high conversion rates, and another for nations
with low conversion rates. The dividing line that differentiates the
two groups is one-half the global conversion rate. If a nation’s
national conversion rate is higher than the global conversion rate

191. Frederic Achard et al., Accounting for Avoided Conversion of Intact and Non-Intact
Forests: Technical Options and a Proposal for a Policy Tool 2, (European Commission Joint
Research Centre discussion paper), available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/NR/rdonlyres/
D0207F59-8D5D-4362-A706-46AEE48619AA/0/JRCProposal.pdf.
192. Id.; see also Danilo Mollicone et al., An Incentive Mechanism for Reducing Emissions
from Conversion of Intact and Non-intact Forests, 83 CLIMATIC CHANGE 477 (2007) (addressing
the European Commission Joint Research Centre proposal).
193. Achard et al., supra note 192, at 2.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Achard et al., supra note 192, at 2.

Abate & Wright_final_cpcxns.doc

114

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/25/2010 3:08:17 PM

Vol. 20:87

baseline, then that nation must reduce its conversion rate to earn
tradable credits. Likewise, if a nation’s conversion rate is below the
global conversion baseline, then that nation must continue to
maintain its conversion rate below the global baseline to earn
tradable credits. Once a nation is placed into one of these two
categories, its forests are valued and placed into one of the following
sub-categories: (1) intact to non-intact, (2) intact to non-forest, or (3)
non-intact to non-forest. A nation’s forest status is paired with its
conversion rate, and this information is used to calculate the nation’s
overall conversion rate over the commitment period, which
200
determines the type of tradable carbon credits that are issued.
The credits issued are temporary and are issued to participating
201
nations on an annual basis. The goal of this approach is to avoid the
permanence problem, as the drafters were concerned about the
202
volatility of preserved carbon via tropical forests. Carbon preserved
in rainforests is “volatile” because preserved carbon can be released
through illegal logging, wildfires, and increased logging in later
203
commitment periods.
One drawback of the JRC proposal is its relative complexity
compared to the compensated reductions plan. While the JRC
proposal’s distinction between intact and non-intact forests makes
sense, it may lead to some confusion in the initial pilot runs of any
forest carbon credit system. Moreover, it could be marred by the
same cumbersome procedural requirement red tape that has rendered
the CDM ineffective. Perhaps the international community would be
better served by the implementation of the JRC or a JRC-like plan in
later commitment periods after a REDD crediting scheme has been
implemented. This would provide time to gain a sense of how such a
plan would function in actual practice. Nevertheless, the JRC
proposal contains an element that is essential to any effective REDD
crediting proposal—crediting nations that have effectively conserved
their forests and do not have high deforestation rates (i.e., HFLD
nations).

200. Id. at 3.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. See id. (“[T]hese [credits] should be considered only as temporary preserved carbon,
because of the non-permanent nature of such preserved carbon.”).
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IV. THE HYBRID COMPENSATED REDUCTIONS AND PREVENTIVE
CREDITS PROPOSAL
This section describes the components of a hybrid proposal that
integrates the advantages of the two proposals addressed in Part III.
It discusses how this new plan responds to the challenges in crediting
reductions in deforestation discussed in Part II, how such credits
could be financed, and the legal framework under which this proposal
could be implemented to ensure optimal impact.
A. Components of the Proposal
This plan combines elements from the compensated reductions
and the JRC proposals. Like compensated reductions, entry into the
hybrid plan is voluntary for any developing tropical nation. However,
after a nation implements the hybrid plan and earns tradable credits
for initial reductions or preventive measures, it is then bound for
future commitment periods. Under the hybrid plan, an international
baseline is set from the global tropical deforestation rate, calculated
by using each tropical nation’s deforestation rate over a recent span
of years (e.g., 1995–2005) to create a global deforestation average.
The hybrid plan accounts for deforestation, not forest conversion.
Thus, it requires the parties to the treaty to determine what level of
forest degradation is to be monitored (e.g., selective logging, clear-cut
logging, slash and burn tactics, and land conversion) as well as the
level of disturbance that will constitute “deforestation” for purposes
of monitoring and accounting.
Like the baseline set in the JRC proposal, this international
baseline will be set below the global deforestation average for
developing tropical nations. For example, it could be set at one-half
of the global tropical deforestation average. Along with the
international baseline, participating nations will also set a national
baseline determined by the particular nation’s domestic deforestation
rate over a set period. To ensure uniformity, each nation’s domestic
deforestation rate is measured over the same span of years from
which the international average is calculated.
After the international and domestic baselines are set,
participating nations would be placed into one of two categories.
Category I consists of those nations whose domestic deforestation
rate is higher than the international baseline. Category I nations will
operate on the compensated reductions system. Category II consists
of those nations whose domestic deforestation rate is lower than the
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international baseline. These nations will operate on a preventive
credits system.
Category I nations will be assigned a national baseline based on
the average of their past deforestation rates over a set period. If a
nation successfully reduces its deforestation rate below its national
baseline during the commitment period, the nation will be issued
tradable carbon certificates equivalent to the amount of carbon
emissions reduced. The amount of credits allotted to a Category I
nation for reductions below the baseline should be determined by the
participating nations. As an example, Category I credits could be
determined according to the quantity of measurement units (e.g.,
acres) by which a particular nation reduced its deforestation rate from
its baseline yearly average. Thus, each measurement unit will
represent a certain quantity of stored carbon. Because tropical
forests differ globally, and one acre of forest in one nation may store
204
more carbon than one acre of forest in another nation,
measurement units could be adjusted per nation to ensure each
carbon credit represents the same amount of net carbon reduction.
Category II nations will operate on a preventive credits system.
Under this system, a nation’s forests will be measured to determine
how much carbon is stored therein. A nation’s forests will be valued
by assigning a plot of land (e.g., an acre) an approximate amount of
stored carbon, and credits will be issued in each commitment period
according to the quantity of carbon preserved (i.e., any accounted
tract of forest that has a level of forest disturbance below the
205
monitoring level).
Baselines may need to be readjusted to ensure that they
accurately reflect the current status of tropical deforestation in a
particular country. This approach makes certain baselines reflect
realistic targets for each nation. For example, a Category I nation
that is not successful in decreasing deforestation during the first
commitment period, and increases its national deforestation rate, may
no longer have any incentive to decrease deforestation. The reason
for this phenomenon is that as a nation falls from its national
baseline, it is less likely to be successful in achieving its target
reduction to earn tradable credits. Consequently, the market drivers
204. See generally Robert W. Malmsheimer et al., Forest Management Solutions for
Mitigating Climate Change in the United States, 106 J. FORESTRY 115–173 (2008).
205. As is the case with Category I nations, it must also be determined for Category II
nations what minimum disturbance will constitute “deforestation” for purposes of monitoring
and accounting preventive credits.
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of deforestation will be more powerful, especially in the short-term,
for these nations, which significantly diminishes any further incentive
to participate in the hybrid plan. If baselines are adjusted, however,
nations whose initial baseline target has become unattainable will still
have an incentive to decrease deforestation in future commitment
206
periods.
Conversely, a Category I nation that successfully implements the
hybrid plan may operate on a baseline much lower than its initial
national baseline. Consequently, the credits this nation receives in
subsequent commitment periods will not reflect any actual reduction
207
in carbon emissions, which will cause additionality concerns. Thus,
while it is essential to maintain national baselines at a constant level
for several commitment periods, it may be necessary to reevaluate
them to ensure the baselines represent realistic targets for each
208
nation.
The international baseline should be adjusted every two
commitment periods (approximately every 10 years), as decreasing or
increasing trends in tropical deforestation may increase or reduce the
global average. Changes in the international baseline are important,
as some Category I nations may decrease deforestation to rates below
the international baseline. Under these circumstances, Category I
nations will be re-designated as Category II, and will operate on the
209
preventive credits system.
For nations initially designated as
Category II, these nations may increase their deforestation rate above
the international baseline. Under these circumstances, Category II
nations may be re-designated as Category I nations.
B. Addressing Monitoring, Permanence, Additionality, and Leakage
Like other plans that credit tropical nations for REDD activities,
the hybrid plan must address monitoring, permanence, additionality,
and leakage. For monitoring, satellite and radar technology is

206. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 40.
207. See id.
208. Baseline adjustment could occur either on an as needed basis determined by the
governing parties to a treaty, or more preferably, on a set baseline reevaluation system, where
baselines are reevaluated, for example, every ten years or two comment periods.
209. At first glance this may seem disadvantageous to a particular Category I nation which
has been very successful in decreasing deforestation. However, due to baseline adjustment, this
nation’s baseline would be adjusted making it more difficult to earn as many credits. Therefore,
shifting a nation to the preventive credits system may actually prove to be more profitable for
that nation in terms of credits earned.
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becoming so advanced today that even selective logging projects can
210
be monitored. Moreover, computer modeling is available to track
211
deforestation trends.
At the 2006 UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice REDD workshop, experts
concluded that the remote sensing technology that currently exists is
212
sufficient to adequately measure deforestation.
The biggest challenge with monitoring is that many nations
cannot afford the necessary technology to effectively monitor their
213
tropical forests.
The most effective way to combat this financial
problem is through international funding. International funds can be
implemented to aid developing nations in acquiring the necessary
infrastructure to make the hybrid plan a reality. One potential source
for international funding is the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
The GEF is administered by the World Bank, the United Nations
Environment Programme, and the United Nations Development
214
Programme.
The GEF has been the primary mechanism for
financially assisting developing nations in addressing global
215
environmental problems.
The GEF’s funding is restricted to
funding the costs of implementing measures to address six
international environmental problems: climate change, ozone
depletion, conservation of biological diversity, protection of
216
international waters, desertification, and organic pollutants.
The
GEF also funds incremental activities that address land degradation,
217
desertification, and deforestation. In addition to addressing global
environmental problems, the GEF provides the primary source of
218
funding for the Climate Change Convention.
The hybrid plan
meets several of these funding parameters, and is thus a worthy
candidate for GEF funding. Importantly, however, the hybrid plan
219
must operate through the UNFCCC to be eligible for GEF funding.
Another potential source of funding for the hybrid plan is the
World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), which was

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Mitchell et al., supra note 128, at 33.
Id. at 19.
MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 31.
See infra Part II. A.
Hunter et al., supra note 9, at 1584.
Id. at 1583.
Id. at 1584.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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220

launched at the December 2007 COP in Bali, Indonesia. This $350
million fund is designed in part to assist developing nations obtain the
221
required infrastructure needed to participate in REDD markets.
The World Bank, however, is not looked upon favorably by all,
especially by many environmental organizations. For example,
environmentalists have criticized the World Bank for being one of the
222
key supporters of Amazon cattle ranching.
Therefore, while the
223
World Bank is unveiling plans to the UN to curb deforestation, it is
at the same time funding one of the main industries driving
224
deforestation in the Amazon.
Nevertheless, the World Bank is
currently the most viable source of funding for many developing
225
nations to establish adequate monitoring systems.
Importantly,
funding from either the GEF or the FCPF should only be temporary.
Once a nation earns tradable carbon credits under the hybrid plan,
these nations should use the income generated from these credits to
fund the costs of monitoring.
The hybrid plan ensures permanence of credits by requiring
Category I nations that have received tradable credits for reductions
in one commitment period and have subsequently increased
deforestation in a later commitment period to make up for this
increased deforestation before any future credits will be issued. Thus,
the amount of increased deforestation will be a mandatory target for
226
the nation in the next commitment period.
This method ensures
that nations are unable to profit by earning and trading credits for
conserving an area of forest and then later deforesting the area.
Permanence is a different issue for Category II nations. In these
nations, any increase in deforestation will simply result in fewer
tradable carbon credits.

220. MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 17.
221. Indonesia has applied for funding under this program and is developing domestic
REDD regulations that are expected to be released in 2009. David Fogarty, Indonesia Applies
for World Bank Forest CO2 Scheme, Carbon Offsets Daily, Mar. 4, 2009, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/idUKSP394051.
222. Daniel Howden, World Bank Pledges to Save Trees…Then Helps Cut Down Amazon
Forest, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/
environment/climate-change/world-bank-pledges-to-save-trees-then-helps-cut-down-amazonforest-769997.html.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See generally Moutinho et al., supra note 18.
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A key issue is how to treat a nation that loses an expanse of
tropical forest due to non-anthropocentric means, such as a naturally
occurring fire. This phenomenon is common in tropical nations in
years of drought, and for areas of forest near land that has been
227
cleared by humans for agricultural activities or logging.
Because
tropical forest fires seem to be positively correlated with human
228
deforestation and degradation of forested regions, it seems the most
effective way to account for tracts of forest lost to fire is simply to
calculate that area lost into the nation’s deforestation rate. This
approach will also prevent nations from fraudulently burning forest to
clear land for other activities.
The tradeoff between additionality and leakage lies at the heart
of the hybrid plan. Simply crediting REDD activities at the national
229
level will inevitably lead to international leakage.
On the other
hand, issuing preventive credits to HFLD nations poses additionality
issues, as this may result in “hot air,” with no overall net reduction in
carbon emissions resulting from the trade of preventive credits.
However, when viewing this problem in relation to the compensated
reductions plan, the potential for hot air resulting from the trade of
preventive credits is less an issue of additionality and more a problem
of international leakage. The benefits of issuing preventive credits
outweigh the drawbacks. Measures can be taken to reduce the
amount of hot air in any one commitment period. For example,
restricting the amount of preventive credits that may be traded in a
particular commitment period reduces the potential for hot air. With
an appropriate, restricted level of credits in the market, Category II
nations will earn enough compensation to withstand the pressures of
international leakage, while developed nations will not be able to
purchase a substantial amount of these preventive credits because of
the preventive credit trading caps per comment period. The most
credits tradable on the carbon market at any one time from the
hybrid plan will be those traded by Category I nations, which
guarantees actual net reductions in carbon emissions from decreased
deforestation.

227. Rhett A. Butler, 2007 Amazon Fires Among Worst Ever, MONGA BAY, Oct. 22, 2007,
http://news.mongabay.com/2007/1021-amazon.html.
228. Ane Alencar et al., Carbon Emissions Associated with Forest Fires in Brazil, in
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 24 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan
Schwartzman eds., 2005).
229. See MADEIRA, supra note 75, at 47.
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Therefore, hot air from preventive credits is less of a problem
than international leakage, as hot air can be adequately monitored
and regulated by the markets. International leakage, on the other
hand, cannot be adequately monitored because it is not a component
of the emissions trading scheme, but is instead a reaction to it,
thereby limiting the regulated community’s control over the problem.
C. Which Legal Framework?
Another critical issue is the legal framework under which the
hybrid plan would operate. This topic has been discussed in the
context of compensated reductions, and that discussion is relevant
when thinking about potential legal frameworks for the hybrid plan.
One option that has been explored is amending the CDM to credit
230
reductions in deforestation.
The main advantage of amending the CDM is that it is relatively
231
straightforward, and it operates within an existing framework.
Theoretically, the hybrid plan could be incorporated into the CDM
232
by simply amending the Marrakesh Accords to allow land use, land
233
use change, and forestry (LULUCF) projects. As simple as it may
sound, incorporating the hybrid plan into the CDM would not work.
First, the Marrakesh Accords, the process during which the
234
CDM was established, involved extensive negotiation. Attempting
to fit the hybrid plan into the CDM would undermine and potentially
235
In the formative negotiations of the
undo these fragile terms.
CDM, accounting for LULUCF was a controversial issue, and the
236
negotiating parties struggled to reach a satisfactory agreement.
Opponents of incorporating LULUCF into the CDM argued that
because the carbon reductions due to forestry projects could not be
accurately measured, they did not satisfy Article 12(5)(b) of the

230. Annie Petsonk, Rewarding Reductions, Realizing Results: Legal Options for Making
Compensated Reduction a Reality, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 119.
121 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005), available at http://
www.edf.org/documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 119.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 121.
235. Id.
236. Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, supra note 1, at 644.
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237

Kyoto Protocol.
Second, the CDM is a project-level mechanism,
and the hybrid plan operates on the national and international
238
levels. Third, the Marrakesh Accords declared that that LULUCF
projects cannot exceed 5% of base year emissions for the Annex I
239
If a similar cap on
country in the first commitment period.
LULUCF activities is implemented in the next commitment period, it
would severely limit the extent to which developing nations may
participate in the carbon market, and would not allow the hybrid plan
to operate on a large enough scale to fully address the tropical
240
deforestation problem. Fourth, amending the CDM would require
that participating parties must be parties to Kyoto, and this may
241
disqualify some potential participants.
Finally, the CDM’s strict
242
additionality requirement would nullify any plan to incorporate
preventive credits, thus ruling out the hybrid plan as a possible
option.
A second and more viable legal option would be to implement
the hybrid plan into Kyoto’s post-2012 successor when such an
instrument is developed.
Since the hybrid plan focuses on
deforestation and its relation to climate change, this plan would likely
garner support under the UNFCCC framework. The hybrid plan
could easily be incorporated into the successor to the Kyoto Protocol
because many of the terms that make incorporating the hybrid plan
into Kyoto difficult could be amended. Assuming that all of the
current parties to Kyoto ratify the post-2012 agreement, another
benefit of this option is that there would already be a significant base
of nations that are parties to the agreement, which would ensure a
significant market for the credits issued under the hybrid plan.
A third option is to create an entirely new protocol under the
UNFCCC, or perhaps even an agreement outside of the climate
243
change framework (e.g., the UN Forum on Forests).
Operating

237. The argument was that Article 12(5)(b) requires that reductions be real, measurable,
and long-term in order to receive CDM certification, none of which was guaranteed by forestry
projects. Id. at 656.
238. See Petsonk, supra note 230, at 121.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See Axel Michaelowa, Determination of Baselines and Additionality for the CDM, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSION REDUCTION
MECHANISMS 289–304 (Farhana Yamin ed., 2005), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/Michaelowa_Determination.pdf.
243. Petsonk, supra note 230, at 121–22.
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completely outside of the Kyoto or Kyoto-successor framework
would have several advantages. One advantage is that nations that
have not become parties to Kyoto may be more willing to adopt this
244
new treaty. The United States is a prime example of such a nation.
However, one major disadvantage to this option is that it does not
245
guarantee parties access to the carbon markets. The existing carbon
246
If the emissions
markets are essentially a product of Kyoto.
reductions credits issued through the hybrid plan are not accepted
under the Kyoto or Kyoto-successor framework, there will be little
demand for these credits. If the parties to Kyoto cannot use the
emissions credits issued under the hybrid plan to meet their emissions
cap obligations, it would be a major blow to a new agreement outside
the Kyoto system. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict how many
nations would ratify this new treaty. Therefore, such an accord does
not guarantee the same consensus that a post-Kyoto agreement is
likely to have.
CONCLUSION
Tropical rainforest conservation is an essential step in responding
to the global climate change crisis. Given current rates of tropical
deforestation, the time to act is now. Any post-2012 climate change
treaty or forest conservation treaty must address emissions from
tropical deforestation if significant reductions in global carbon
dioxide emissions are to be achieved. Moreover, implementing
measures and incentives to preserve the world’s tropical forests offers
benefits that extend far beyond the value that such preservation
provides in reducing global carbon emissions from avoided
deforestation and forest degradation.
Under the existing Kyoto framework and the CDM mechanism,
there is no opportunity to earn credits for avoided deforestation. The
hybrid plan proposed in this article is a valuable first step in
addressing this problem. The most significant challenge for any
crediting system for reduced deforestation is the tradeoff between
additionality and leakage. The hybrid plan does not completely
resolve this issue, but the benefits gained by eliminating potential
international leakage outweigh potential additionality issues.

244. Id. at 122.
245. Id. (explaining that the “currency” of any new agreement may not be accepted by the
UNFCCC markets).
246. See id.
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Moreover, the hybrid plan could be readily incorporated into the
post-Kyoto regulatory framework—and thereby capitalize on the
consensus reflected in the existing Kyoto regime—by
institutionalizing REDD as a component of a mandatory regulatory
scheme to combat global climate change.

